# Architecture Decision Record: Keycloak for Secret Management ## Status Proposed ### TODO [#3](https://git.nationtech.io/NationTech/harmony/issues/3): Before accepting this proposal we need to run a POC to validate this potential issue : **Keycloak Misuse**: Using Keycloak primarily as a secrets manager is inappropriate, as it's designed for identity and access management (IAM), not secrets management. This creates scalability and functionality limitations. ## Context Our infrastructure orchestration requires a robust secret management system as part of our automation project to support secure transitions from development to production environments. Key considerations include: 1. **User lifecycle management**: In enterprise settings, developers and administrators frequently join and leave projects, creating security risks if their access to secrets isn't properly revoked. 2. **Security limitations with file-based solutions**: Traditional encrypted file-based approaches (like SOPS) present challenges with user revocation, as departed users can retain local copies of encrypted files and continue accessing secrets indefinitely. 3. **Authentication integration**: Our solution needs to integrate with existing identity providers to leverage centralized authentication systems already in place. 4. **Diverse user base**: Our solution must work well for both enterprise teams and small organizations/individual developers without imposing excessive complexity. 5. **Operational simplicity**: The solution should minimize the cognitive overhead required to manage secrets securely. ## Decision We will implement Keycloak as our secret management solution with the following workflow: 1. Projects will contain only configuration metadata indicating where secrets are stored and which identity provider to use. 2. When a developer runs the project locally, they will be automatically prompted to authenticate via SSO (browser-based or TOTP). 3. Upon successful authentication, the application will use the developer's credentials to retrieve appropriate secrets from the centralized Keycloak server. 4. When a developer leaves the organization, their SSO access is revoked, automatically removing their ability to access secrets. For smaller organizations and individual developers, we will provide a fully managed Keycloak instance with: - A free tier supporting a limited number of secrets or API calls - Simplified setup that hides complexity through our automation tooling - Potential for paid tiers as usage scales ### Why keycloack We wanted a solution that met these criterias - Fully open source - Mature - Integrates with various SSO providers - Supports secrets - As easy as possible to deploy on our existing K8s infrastructure - Supports any kind of secret, not just K8s Other considered options : - Vault : not fully pen source - SOPS : no SSO integration, makes user lifecycle harder - AWS Secrets : vendor lock-in and cost - Bitwarden : SSO feature not fully open source ## Consequences ### Positive 1. **Improved security posture**: Secret access is tied directly to centralized identity management, reducing the risk of leaked credentials from former team members. 2. **Simplified developer onboarding**: New team members can immediately access appropriate secrets without manual sharing of encrypted files or keys. 3. **Transparent authentication**: SSO integration creates a seamless experience that leverages existing organizational authentication systems. 4. **Centralized audit capability**: All secret access can be logged and monitored in a single location. 5. **Scalable for different organization sizes**: The managed service option makes enterprise-grade secret management accessible to smaller teams. ### Challenges 1. **Network dependency**: Developers require network connectivity to access secrets, which could complicate offline development scenarios. 2. **Operational overhead**: While hidden from most users, we will need to maintain a reliable managed Keycloak service. 3. **Migration complexity**: Existing projects using file-based secret solutions will require migration assistance. 4. **Potential for clipboard leakage**: While more difficult than with file-based solutions, determined users could still manually copy secrets they've legitimately accessed. 5. **Service availability concerns**: Dependency on the centralized secret service creates a potential single point of failure. 6. **Implementation complexity**: Integrating with various SSO providers and creating a seamless developer experience will require significant initial engineering effort.